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ABSTRACT
This paper offers an explanation for observed differences across countries in educational
policies and in resulting interpersonal distributions of human capital.  We analyze a general-
equilibrium model in which, as a result of the apportionment of natural ability, nurturing, and publicly
financed education, some people can be well endowed with human capital, whereas other people are
poorly endowed with human capital.  We assume that people can choose to be either producers or
predators.  An increase in a person’s human capital makes predation a less attractive choice for that
person.  As a result, it is possible that by using some of their human capital to educate the poorly
endowed people rather than to produce consumables the well endowed people can increase their own
consumption.  We also find that the nature of the educational policy that maximizes the consumption
of the well endowed people depends on the ability of producers to enforce a collective choice of the
amount of resources to be allocated to guarding against predators.  Our theory predicts that, if
producers collectively choose the amount of guarding against predators, then the well endowed
people prefer a relatively egalitarian educational policy that increases the human capital of all of the
poorly endowed people.  Such an educational policy either decreases the cost of deterring predation
or makes deterrence possible.  In contrast, if producers or small subsets of producers individually
choose the amount of their resources to allocate to guarding, taking the ratio of predators to
producers as given, then the well endowed people prefer a more elitist educational policy that
decreases the number of poorly endowed people, thereby decreasing the number of predators, without
increasing the human capital of the remaining poorly endowed people.  These implications seem to
be consistent with the facts about differences across countries in educational policy.
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